Total cost: about $10. And it's artificial, and therefore reusable.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Sunday, November 22, 2009
Some Stories
So, I didn't really intend for this to be a political blog. I made it when I was single as a place to just pour out thoughts about different things. It's been getting too political lately, so now I'm just going to put up a couple of stories about my life (and....PICTURES!).
Story 1
I met my wife thanks to my turkey-cooking skillz. I cooked my first turkey on my mission, then cooked several more while I was at BYU. Anyway, soon after I got to Cambridge, I got a call from this girl I'd seen before in the ward, Annie Siddoway. I found it quite flattering that she'd call me, since I thought she was quite pretty. Well, she was actually calling because she needed to cook a turkey for a dinner she was putting on for the guys that had helped her move, but her oven was broken. Since she knew my roommates (in fact, she had dated one of them) and we lived only a couple of blocks from her new apartment, she called my roommates to ask if she could use our oven. But only I was home.
So, soon enough there was a knock at the door, and when I opened it there stood Annie, holding a raw turkey. I showed her to the oven. Soon, however, it became apparent that she (and her roommate that was with her. Of course she never would have come alone) had never cooked a turkey before. Well. I showed her how to cook a turkey. I think she was especially impressed when I momentarily disappeared into my room, reappearing moments later with a baster. Her version of what she was thinking at the time: "Ok, this guy is either incredibly weird or incredibly cute." She has since determined that the former is always true, while the latter is only occasionally true.
To make a long story short, it takes a few hours to cook a turkey, so I had a captive audience. And the rest is history.
Story 2
I have a very odd sense of humor. I'm the kind of man who loves the Muppets, Ask a Ninja, and videos about blenders powered by v8 engines. I also love unintentional comedy--when actors are very much trying to be serious but only succeed in being ridiculous.
This is what makes it so wonderful that Annie and I have so much fun together. There are not that many people that understand or enjoy my sense of humor--most people can enjoy certain parts of it, but Annie enjoys almost all of it. As demonstrated by the gifts she has gotten me so far.
Our first holiday as a couple (not yet a married couple) was Christmas of last year. As she thought of what to get me for Christmas, Annie remembered that one of the most memorable of our early dates was the time we went to see High School Musical 3. As far as unintentional comedy goes, it doesn't get much better than Zac Efron sings and dances out his teenage angst in a high school gym as hundreds of computer-animated basketballs fall around him and lightning flashes in the background. So, for Christmas, Annie got me a Zac Efron t-shirt. There was a lot of laughter at the time...we're still not quite sure what to do with it. I won't wear it in public and she won't let me hang it above her side of the bed.
Valentine's Day brought another fun gift from Annie. Earlier we had discussed one of the kinds of gifts that I loved seeing on Valentine's Day in high school--stuffed animals inside of balloons. To me, there just aren't many more ridiculous looking things. Well. Annie got me socks (Smart Wool socks. Awesome), but had the nerve to go to a gift place and ask them to put the socks into a balloon with confetti and the whole bit. While she definitely got some weird looks from everyone at the store, I absolutely loved it.
Conclusion
That's probably enough stories for one post. I do want to leave everyone with a couple more pictures, just in case you're one day called upon to recognize me or Annie in a crowd and it's been years since you've seen either of us.
Story 1
I met my wife thanks to my turkey-cooking skillz. I cooked my first turkey on my mission, then cooked several more while I was at BYU. Anyway, soon after I got to Cambridge, I got a call from this girl I'd seen before in the ward, Annie Siddoway. I found it quite flattering that she'd call me, since I thought she was quite pretty. Well, she was actually calling because she needed to cook a turkey for a dinner she was putting on for the guys that had helped her move, but her oven was broken. Since she knew my roommates (in fact, she had dated one of them) and we lived only a couple of blocks from her new apartment, she called my roommates to ask if she could use our oven. But only I was home.
So, soon enough there was a knock at the door, and when I opened it there stood Annie, holding a raw turkey. I showed her to the oven. Soon, however, it became apparent that she (and her roommate that was with her. Of course she never would have come alone) had never cooked a turkey before. Well. I showed her how to cook a turkey. I think she was especially impressed when I momentarily disappeared into my room, reappearing moments later with a baster. Her version of what she was thinking at the time: "Ok, this guy is either incredibly weird or incredibly cute." She has since determined that the former is always true, while the latter is only occasionally true.
To make a long story short, it takes a few hours to cook a turkey, so I had a captive audience. And the rest is history.
Story 2
I have a very odd sense of humor. I'm the kind of man who loves the Muppets, Ask a Ninja, and videos about blenders powered by v8 engines. I also love unintentional comedy--when actors are very much trying to be serious but only succeed in being ridiculous.
This is what makes it so wonderful that Annie and I have so much fun together. There are not that many people that understand or enjoy my sense of humor--most people can enjoy certain parts of it, but Annie enjoys almost all of it. As demonstrated by the gifts she has gotten me so far.
Our first holiday as a couple (not yet a married couple) was Christmas of last year. As she thought of what to get me for Christmas, Annie remembered that one of the most memorable of our early dates was the time we went to see High School Musical 3. As far as unintentional comedy goes, it doesn't get much better than Zac Efron sings and dances out his teenage angst in a high school gym as hundreds of computer-animated basketballs fall around him and lightning flashes in the background. So, for Christmas, Annie got me a Zac Efron t-shirt. There was a lot of laughter at the time...we're still not quite sure what to do with it. I won't wear it in public and she won't let me hang it above her side of the bed.
Valentine's Day brought another fun gift from Annie. Earlier we had discussed one of the kinds of gifts that I loved seeing on Valentine's Day in high school--stuffed animals inside of balloons. To me, there just aren't many more ridiculous looking things. Well. Annie got me socks (Smart Wool socks. Awesome), but had the nerve to go to a gift place and ask them to put the socks into a balloon with confetti and the whole bit. While she definitely got some weird looks from everyone at the store, I absolutely loved it.
Conclusion
That's probably enough stories for one post. I do want to leave everyone with a couple more pictures, just in case you're one day called upon to recognize me or Annie in a crowd and it's been years since you've seen either of us.
Tuesday, November 10, 2009
An Account of Democratic Self-Government
The following is from Ronald Dworkin:
To achieve that sense of a national partnership in self-government, it is not enough for a community to treat citizens only as if they were shareholders in a company, giving them votes only in periodic elections of officials. It must design institutions, practices, and conventions that allow them to be more engaged in public life, and to make a contribution to it, even when their views do not prevail. Two conditions are necessary for this:
a) First, each citizen must have a fair and reasonably equal opportunity not only to hear the views of others as these are published or broadcast, but to command attention for his own views, either as a candidate for office or as a member of a politically active group committed to some program or conviction.
b) Second, the tone of public discourse must be appropriate to the deliberations of a partnership or joint venture rather than the selfish negotiations of commercial rivals or military enemies.
If we embraced that attractive account of the conditions of self-government, we would have to accept that democracy—self-government by the people as a whole—is always a matter of degree. It will never be perfectly fulfilled, because it seems incredible that the politics of a pluralistic contemporary society could ever become as egalitarian in access and as deliberative in tone as the standards I just described demand. We would then understand democracy not as a pedigree a nation earns just by adopting some constitutional structure of free elections, but as an ideal toward which any would-be democratic society must continually strive.
We would also have to accept not only that America falls short of important democratic ideals, but that in the age of television politics the shortfall has steadily become worse. The influence of wealth unequally distributed is greater, and its consequences more profound, than at any time in the past, and our politics seem daily more rancorous, ill-spirited, and divisive.
So this analysis of democracy as self-government confirms—and helps to explain—the growing sense of despair about American politics that I began this essay by trying to describe. How should we respond to that despair? We must understand the First Amendment as a challenge, not a barrier to improvement. We must reject the blanket principle the Supreme Court relied on in Buckley, that government should never attempt to regulate the public political discourse in any way, in favor of a more discriminating principle that condemns the constraints that do violate genuine principles of democracy—that deny citizens information they need for political judgment or that deny equality of citizenship for people with unpopular beliefs or tastes, for example—but that nevertheless permits us to try to reverse our democracy's decline.
To achieve that sense of a national partnership in self-government, it is not enough for a community to treat citizens only as if they were shareholders in a company, giving them votes only in periodic elections of officials. It must design institutions, practices, and conventions that allow them to be more engaged in public life, and to make a contribution to it, even when their views do not prevail. Two conditions are necessary for this:
a) First, each citizen must have a fair and reasonably equal opportunity not only to hear the views of others as these are published or broadcast, but to command attention for his own views, either as a candidate for office or as a member of a politically active group committed to some program or conviction.
b) Second, the tone of public discourse must be appropriate to the deliberations of a partnership or joint venture rather than the selfish negotiations of commercial rivals or military enemies.
If we embraced that attractive account of the conditions of self-government, we would have to accept that democracy—self-government by the people as a whole—is always a matter of degree. It will never be perfectly fulfilled, because it seems incredible that the politics of a pluralistic contemporary society could ever become as egalitarian in access and as deliberative in tone as the standards I just described demand. We would then understand democracy not as a pedigree a nation earns just by adopting some constitutional structure of free elections, but as an ideal toward which any would-be democratic society must continually strive.
We would also have to accept not only that America falls short of important democratic ideals, but that in the age of television politics the shortfall has steadily become worse. The influence of wealth unequally distributed is greater, and its consequences more profound, than at any time in the past, and our politics seem daily more rancorous, ill-spirited, and divisive.
So this analysis of democracy as self-government confirms—and helps to explain—the growing sense of despair about American politics that I began this essay by trying to describe. How should we respond to that despair? We must understand the First Amendment as a challenge, not a barrier to improvement. We must reject the blanket principle the Supreme Court relied on in Buckley, that government should never attempt to regulate the public political discourse in any way, in favor of a more discriminating principle that condemns the constraints that do violate genuine principles of democracy—that deny citizens information they need for political judgment or that deny equality of citizenship for people with unpopular beliefs or tastes, for example—but that nevertheless permits us to try to reverse our democracy's decline.
Monday, March 2, 2009
Risk/Reward Question
So, it's unprecedented for me to post twice in a single day, but I have a question now.
I just read this.
Among other societal/economic problems right now, we have a lack of risk taking and a dearth of effective leadership. If we want to increase risk, do we have to decrease scrutiny and criticism? If so, how can we do it w/o unconstitutionally abrogating speech?
We need more warrior/adventurer spirit. How can we get it?
I just read this.
Among other societal/economic problems right now, we have a lack of risk taking and a dearth of effective leadership. If we want to increase risk, do we have to decrease scrutiny and criticism? If so, how can we do it w/o unconstitutionally abrogating speech?
We need more warrior/adventurer spirit. How can we get it?
A Political Thought or Two
It's probably pointless to post this here, since most (if not all) the people who read this blog usually vote Republican. But in any case.
Here's a recurring theme in present day politics. The President (a liberal Democrat) or the Congress (majority Democrat, with liberal Democrats in the highest leadership positions) proposes a governmental solution to some problem--be it the economic/financial crisis, health care, whatever. Republicans, and especially conservatives, decry the solution as one that a) likely won't work, and b) involves too great an expansion of government power. The Democrats' rejoinder, at least in large part, is often "all you're doing is criticizing. You haven't offered another solution."
While that may be true (the Republicans/conservatives who offer the criticism may not have been thinking of a solution), there seems to be an obvious counterpoint that at least the Democrats are missing. That is, that the alternative "solution" may not be that the government do something else. It may be that the government do less, if not nothing. To assume that this is the equivalent of "do nothing" is to assume that the government is the only possible actor in the situation.
Republicans'/conservatives' preference--and perhaps mine, though I just don't think I know enough to make strong claims about what will and won't work--might be that private individuals, private groups of individuals, and private business entities work for themselves, stimulating the economy through their own economic activity. The idea is that you work for yourself; don't ask government to work for you. It won't do a good job.
This leads to other questions, such as whether the distribution of wealth and power in the market has become such that a small number of powerful actors working in their own self-interest make it impossible to achieve everyone's self interest (I feel like game theory should come into this, somehow, but I don't know enough about game theory). If that is the case, maybe the government does need to level the playing field somehow? But I don't know that I'm quite ready to believe that.
On a related note, I tire of the argument that Republicans' failed policies got us into this mess, so their proposed solutions have no merit. The ability to see mistakes in hindsight says nothing about the merits of proposed solutions to current problems. It means neither a) that Republicans proposals won't work for current problems, nor b) that Democrats' proposed solutions will. Yes, the Democrats have an electoral mandate to try their solutions, but that doesn't mean they can assume the Republicans' solutions to current problems are wrong just because some Republican policies arguably led to undesirable consequences.
In the end, I don't know the future any more than the people that are making these arguments. And really, I hope their solutions work, because they're the only solutions we're likely to get for a long time, given who's in power right now. But I hate bad argumentation.
Here's a recurring theme in present day politics. The President (a liberal Democrat) or the Congress (majority Democrat, with liberal Democrats in the highest leadership positions) proposes a governmental solution to some problem--be it the economic/financial crisis, health care, whatever. Republicans, and especially conservatives, decry the solution as one that a) likely won't work, and b) involves too great an expansion of government power. The Democrats' rejoinder, at least in large part, is often "all you're doing is criticizing. You haven't offered another solution."
While that may be true (the Republicans/conservatives who offer the criticism may not have been thinking of a solution), there seems to be an obvious counterpoint that at least the Democrats are missing. That is, that the alternative "solution" may not be that the government do something else. It may be that the government do less, if not nothing. To assume that this is the equivalent of "do nothing" is to assume that the government is the only possible actor in the situation.
Republicans'/conservatives' preference--and perhaps mine, though I just don't think I know enough to make strong claims about what will and won't work--might be that private individuals, private groups of individuals, and private business entities work for themselves, stimulating the economy through their own economic activity. The idea is that you work for yourself; don't ask government to work for you. It won't do a good job.
This leads to other questions, such as whether the distribution of wealth and power in the market has become such that a small number of powerful actors working in their own self-interest make it impossible to achieve everyone's self interest (I feel like game theory should come into this, somehow, but I don't know enough about game theory). If that is the case, maybe the government does need to level the playing field somehow? But I don't know that I'm quite ready to believe that.
On a related note, I tire of the argument that Republicans' failed policies got us into this mess, so their proposed solutions have no merit. The ability to see mistakes in hindsight says nothing about the merits of proposed solutions to current problems. It means neither a) that Republicans proposals won't work for current problems, nor b) that Democrats' proposed solutions will. Yes, the Democrats have an electoral mandate to try their solutions, but that doesn't mean they can assume the Republicans' solutions to current problems are wrong just because some Republican policies arguably led to undesirable consequences.
In the end, I don't know the future any more than the people that are making these arguments. And really, I hope their solutions work, because they're the only solutions we're likely to get for a long time, given who's in power right now. But I hate bad argumentation.
Sunday, February 8, 2009
My Thoughts on Punishment
Thanks to everyone who posted a comment about punishment. I'm going to try to explain the difficulties I see with punishment, and then I'll go into what I think a good system of punishment might be. I should stipulate at the outset that I'm mostly talking about societal punishment of criminals. A couple of the comments on the last post were about punishing children, which I hadn't really thought about before, but is a really important arena in which to understand punishment as well. Since the comments on that topic came from actual mothers, I probably won't go into that topic very deeply here for fear of sounding like an idiot.
Difficulties with Punishment
1. Punishment is returning harm for harm. The old adage says that two wrongs don't make a right. On its face this argument is too simplistic, but it's one I've heard. After all, the physical acts themselves--both the criminal's and society's--are harms (say for example, robbing and confining a robber to prison). But the difference between the acts is at a metaphysical level. As we conceptualize it, the robber steals to enrich himself and takes what is not rightfully his (or hers). But confining the robber to prison is done to satisfy justice, deter future crime, rehabilitate the criminal (teach him/her to be a productive member of society), or incapacitate the criminal so that he/she can do no more harm.
But what about the robber who steals food to avoid starvation? What about criminals who were tricked or coerced into committing crime? We still punish these people, reasoning that such people make criminal errors in judgment. But if what justifies society in imposing a harm is its motive, then why can't many crimes be justified because of the criminals' good motives?
2. Problems with Retributivism- I think everyone has a sense of justice. And my heart, my gut, my moral sense--whatever you want to call it--tells me that wrongdoers deserve punishment simply because of their acts and without reference to any future outcome. As Immanuel Kant says, "Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means of promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another...He must first be found guilty and punishable, before there can be any thought of drawing from his punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow-citizens. The penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even from the due measure of it, according to the Pharisaic maxim: 'it is better that one man should die than that the whole people should perish.' For if justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer have any value in the world."
Now, I don't fully agree with Kant here, and that's the trouble: Kant's view is pure retributivism. As he says, retributive punishment is punishment because of guilt, and only because of guilt. When asked "Why do we punish the criminal?", the retributivist replies "Because he is guilty." But I don't believe that guilt is the only purpose of punishment. After all, Kant's "Pharisaic maxim" is actually divine reasoning: "it is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief" (1 Ne. 4:13).
3. Problems with Utilitarianism- in their pure form, utilitarian justifications for punishment don't work either. Utilitarians hold that punishment can have three purposes, all of which are net positive consequences. First, punishment can serve to deter future crime, both by the criminal punished and by others who would otherwise commit the same crime. Second, punishment can rehabilitate the criminal, helping him/her become a productive member of society. Rehabilitation also serves to deter any future crime the rehabilitated would have committed. Third, punishment can incapacitate the criminal, keeping him/her from committing any future crime.
Theoretically, these are good ideas. But do they work practically? America's efforts at rehabilitation (it was a prominent theory in the 70's) proved costly and ineffective. Also, what if someone commits a crime, then realizes the wrongness of her actions and reforms herself so that she will never commit crime again, and all this without punishment. Then, according to rehabilitation theory, there would be no reason to punish the criminal. But that seems wrong because of the reasons for retributivism. Incapacitation only works if you keep the criminal in custody until he/she can no longer commit crime, which may be until either infirmity or death. Deterrence is more interesting, but leads to questions about what level of severity is necessary to effectively deter. The level of severity required to deter may exceed the level of severity that is proportional to the crime committed. Furthermore, there may be many crimes that no punishment will deter, such as crimes of passion or crimes committed by those who have nothing to lose. In many cases, such crimes are the most violent and most harmful of all. What good is punishment if it cannot deter those crimes?
Beginnings of a Theory
The feeling I've gotten in discussions on punishment in the past is that retributivism and utilitarianism are mutually exclusive, just as deontology and utilitarianism are alternative moral theories that cannot be easily combined. But I see good things in both of them, and I think parts of both are necessary to a good theory of punishment.
I'm tempted to say that utilitarian punishment is good for this life, and we should leave retributive punishment to God, who knows both who deserves punishment and how much punishment is deserved. But isn't there something dangerous about leaving one's moral sense unsatisfied?
There's a lot more to say about this, but I feel like I've said enough that some of you may have thoughts about it that will be valuable to hear before I write any more. Then again, you may all be bored with this by now and ready to move on to something else. But, as you can tell, I'm still not out of the woods on this one, and I would still appreciate your help.
Difficulties with Punishment
1. Punishment is returning harm for harm. The old adage says that two wrongs don't make a right. On its face this argument is too simplistic, but it's one I've heard. After all, the physical acts themselves--both the criminal's and society's--are harms (say for example, robbing and confining a robber to prison). But the difference between the acts is at a metaphysical level. As we conceptualize it, the robber steals to enrich himself and takes what is not rightfully his (or hers). But confining the robber to prison is done to satisfy justice, deter future crime, rehabilitate the criminal (teach him/her to be a productive member of society), or incapacitate the criminal so that he/she can do no more harm.
But what about the robber who steals food to avoid starvation? What about criminals who were tricked or coerced into committing crime? We still punish these people, reasoning that such people make criminal errors in judgment. But if what justifies society in imposing a harm is its motive, then why can't many crimes be justified because of the criminals' good motives?
2. Problems with Retributivism- I think everyone has a sense of justice. And my heart, my gut, my moral sense--whatever you want to call it--tells me that wrongdoers deserve punishment simply because of their acts and without reference to any future outcome. As Immanuel Kant says, "Juridical punishment can never be administered merely as a means of promoting another good either with regard to the criminal himself or to civil society, but must in all cases be imposed only because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a crime. For one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another...He must first be found guilty and punishable, before there can be any thought of drawing from his punishment any benefit for himself or his fellow-citizens. The penal law is a categorical imperative; and woe to him who creeps through the serpent-windings of utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge him from the justice of punishment, or even from the due measure of it, according to the Pharisaic maxim: 'it is better that one man should die than that the whole people should perish.' For if justice and righteousness perish, human life would no longer have any value in the world."
Now, I don't fully agree with Kant here, and that's the trouble: Kant's view is pure retributivism. As he says, retributive punishment is punishment because of guilt, and only because of guilt. When asked "Why do we punish the criminal?", the retributivist replies "Because he is guilty." But I don't believe that guilt is the only purpose of punishment. After all, Kant's "Pharisaic maxim" is actually divine reasoning: "it is better that one man should perish than that a nation should dwindle and perish in unbelief" (1 Ne. 4:13).
3. Problems with Utilitarianism- in their pure form, utilitarian justifications for punishment don't work either. Utilitarians hold that punishment can have three purposes, all of which are net positive consequences. First, punishment can serve to deter future crime, both by the criminal punished and by others who would otherwise commit the same crime. Second, punishment can rehabilitate the criminal, helping him/her become a productive member of society. Rehabilitation also serves to deter any future crime the rehabilitated would have committed. Third, punishment can incapacitate the criminal, keeping him/her from committing any future crime.
Theoretically, these are good ideas. But do they work practically? America's efforts at rehabilitation (it was a prominent theory in the 70's) proved costly and ineffective. Also, what if someone commits a crime, then realizes the wrongness of her actions and reforms herself so that she will never commit crime again, and all this without punishment. Then, according to rehabilitation theory, there would be no reason to punish the criminal. But that seems wrong because of the reasons for retributivism. Incapacitation only works if you keep the criminal in custody until he/she can no longer commit crime, which may be until either infirmity or death. Deterrence is more interesting, but leads to questions about what level of severity is necessary to effectively deter. The level of severity required to deter may exceed the level of severity that is proportional to the crime committed. Furthermore, there may be many crimes that no punishment will deter, such as crimes of passion or crimes committed by those who have nothing to lose. In many cases, such crimes are the most violent and most harmful of all. What good is punishment if it cannot deter those crimes?
Beginnings of a Theory
The feeling I've gotten in discussions on punishment in the past is that retributivism and utilitarianism are mutually exclusive, just as deontology and utilitarianism are alternative moral theories that cannot be easily combined. But I see good things in both of them, and I think parts of both are necessary to a good theory of punishment.
I'm tempted to say that utilitarian punishment is good for this life, and we should leave retributive punishment to God, who knows both who deserves punishment and how much punishment is deserved. But isn't there something dangerous about leaving one's moral sense unsatisfied?
There's a lot more to say about this, but I feel like I've said enough that some of you may have thoughts about it that will be valuable to hear before I write any more. Then again, you may all be bored with this by now and ready to move on to something else. But, as you can tell, I'm still not out of the woods on this one, and I would still appreciate your help.
Thursday, January 29, 2009
Why Do We Punish?
I'm back! But I'm back with a purpose. I've been trying to figure out why we punish, both as a society and in a religious context. And I can't figure it out, so I need your input. Here's a brief note from my Criminal Law casebook describing the two basic theories:
"Broadly speaking, the justifications for punishment fall into two large categories, retributive and utilitarian. A retributivist claims that punishment is justified because people deserve it; a utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful purposes that punishment serves. Retributive rationales are essentially backward looking, as they seek to justify punishment on the basis of the offender's behavior in the past. Utilitarian rationales are essentially forward looking, as they seek to justify punishment on the basis of the good consequences it is expected to produce in the future."
What do you think? How do we justify punishment?
"Broadly speaking, the justifications for punishment fall into two large categories, retributive and utilitarian. A retributivist claims that punishment is justified because people deserve it; a utilitarian believes that justification lies in the useful purposes that punishment serves. Retributive rationales are essentially backward looking, as they seek to justify punishment on the basis of the offender's behavior in the past. Utilitarian rationales are essentially forward looking, as they seek to justify punishment on the basis of the good consequences it is expected to produce in the future."
What do you think? How do we justify punishment?
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